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Abstract
An adversarial example is an example that has been ad-
justed to produce a wrong label when presented to a sys-
tem at test time. To date, adversarial example constructions
have been demonstrated for classifiers, but not for detec-
tors. If adversarial examples that could fool a detector ex-
ist, they could be used to (for example) maliciously create
security hazards on roads populated with smart vehicles.
In this paper, we demonstrate a construction that success-
fully fools two standard detectors, Faster RCNN and YOLO.
The existence of such examples is surprising, as attacking a
classifier is very different from attacking a detector, and that
the structure of detectors – which must search for their own
bounding box, and which cannot estimate that box very ac-
curately – makes it quite likely that adversarial patterns are
strongly disrupted. We show that our construction produces
adversarial examples that generalize well across sequences
digitally, even though large perturbations are needed. We
also show that our construction yields physical objects that
are adversarial.
1. Introduction
An adversarial example is an example that has been ad-
justed to produce a wrong label when presented to a sys-
tem at test time. In the literature, adversarial examples with
imperceivable perturbations and unexpected properties (e.g.
transferability) are one of the biggest mysteries of neural
networks. There is a range of constructions [19, 21, 20] that
yield adversarial examples for image classifiers, and there
is good evidence that small imperceivable adjustments suf-
fice. Furthermore, Athalye et al. [1] show that it is possible
to build a physical object with visible perturbation patterns
that is persistently misclassified by standard image classi-
fiers from different view angles at a roughly fixed distance.
There is good evidence that adversarial examples built for
one classifier will fool others, too [22, 14]. The success of
these attacks can be seen as a warning not to use highly non-
∗Both authors contributed equally
linear feature constructions without having strong mathe-
matical constraints on what these constructions do; but tak-
ing that position means one cannot use methods that are
largely accurate and effective.
Detectors are not classifiers. A classifier accepts an im-
age and produces a label. In contrast, a detector, like Faster
RCNN [24, 5], identifies bounding boxes that are “worth
labelling”, and then generates labels (which might include
background) for each box. The final label generation
step employs a classifier. However, the statistics of how
bounding boxes cover objects in a detector are complex and
not well understood. Some modern detectors like YOLO
9000 [23] predict boxes and labels using features on a fixed
grid, resulting in fairly complex sampling patterns in the
space of boxes, and this means that pixels outside a box may
participate in labelling that box. Another important differ-
ence is that detectors usually have RoI pooling or feature
map resizing, which might be effective at disrupting adver-
sarial patterns. To date, no successful adversarial attack on
a detector has been demonstrated. In this paper, we demon-
strate successful adversarial attacks on Faster RCNN, which
generalize to YOLO 9000.
We also discuss the generalization ability of adversarial
examples. We say that an adversarial perturbation gener-
alizes if, when circumstances (digital or physical) change,
the corresponding images remain adversarial. For example,
a perturbation of a stop sign generalizes over different dis-
tances if it remains adversarial when the camera approaches
the stop sign. An example generalizes better if it remains
adversarial for more cases (e.g. changes of detector, back-
ground and lighting). If an adversarial example cannot gen-
eralize, it is not a threat in the majority of real world sys-
tems.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We demonstrate a method to construct adversarial ex-
amples that fool Faster RCNN digitally; examples pro-
duced by our method are reliably either missed or mis-
labeled by the detector. These examples without modi-
fication also fool YOLO 9000, indicating that the con-
struction produces examples that can transfer across
models.
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• Our adversarial examples can be physically created
successfully, and they still can fool detectors in suit-
able circumstances. They can also slip through recent
strong image processing defenses against adversarial
examples.
• In practice, we find that adversarial examples require
quite large disruptions to the pattern on the object in
order to fool detectors. Physical adversarial examples
require bigger disruptions than digital examples to suc-
ceed.
2. Background
Adversarial examples are of interest mainly because the
adjustments required seem to be very small and are easy
to obtain [30, 9, 8]. Numerous search procedures gener-
ate adversarial examples [19, 21, 20]; all searches look for
an example that is (a) “near” a correctly labelled example
(typically in L1 or L2 norm), and (b) mislabelled. Printing
adversarial images then photographing them can retain their
adversarial property [13, 1], which suggests that adversarial
examples might exist in the physical world. Their existence
could cause a great deal of mischief. There is some evi-
dence that it is difficult to build physical examples that fool
a stop sign detector [16]. In particular, if one actually takes
a video of an existing adversarial stop sign, the adversar-
ial pattern does not appear to affect the performance of the
detector by much. Lu et al. speculated that this might be be-
cause adversarial patterns were disrupted by being viewed
at different scales, rotations, and orientations. This created
some discussion. OpenAI demonstrated a search procedure
that could produce an image of a cat that was misclassified
when viewed at multiple scales [1]. There is some blur-
ring of the fur texture on the cat they generate, but this
would likely be imperceptible to most observers. OpenAI
also demonstrated an adversarial image of a cat that was
misclassified when viewed at multiple scales and orienta-
tions [1]. However, there are significant visible artifacts on
that image; few would think that it had not been obviously
tampered with.
Recent work has demonstrated physical objects that are
persistently misclassified from different angles at a roughly
fixed distance [1]. The search procedure manipulates the
texture map T of the object. The procedure samples a set of
viewing conditions Vi for the object, then renders to obtain
images I(Vi, T ). Finally, the procedure adjusts the texture
map to obtain images that are (a) close to the original im-
ages and (b) have high probability of misclassification. The
adversarial properties of the resulting objects are robust to
the inevitable errors in color, etc., in producing physical ob-
jects from digital representations.
Defences: There is fair evidence that it is hard to
tell whether an example is adversarial (and so (a) evi-
dence of an attack and (b) likely to be misclassified) or
not [27, 10, 28, 18, 4, 7]. Current procedures to build ad-
versarial examples for deep networks appear to subvert the
feature construction implemented by the network to pro-
duce odd patterns of activation in late stage ReLU’s; this
can be exploited to build one form of defence [15]. There is
some evidence that other feature constructions admit adver-
sarial attacks, too [18]. However, adversarial attacks typ-
ically introduce unnatural (if small) patterns into images,
and image processing methods that remove such patterns
yield successful defenses. Guo et al. showed that cropping
and rescaling, bit depth reduction, JPEG compression and
decompression, resampling and reconstructing using total
variation criteria, and image quilting all provide quite ef-
fective ways of removing adversarial patterns [11].
Detectors and classifiers: It is usual to attack classi-
fiers, and all the attacks we are aware of attack on classi-
fiers. However, for many applications, classifiers are not
useful by themselves. Road sign is a good example. A
road sign classifier would be applied to images that con-
sist largely of a road sign (e.g. those of [29]). But there
is little application need for a road sign classifier except as
a component of a road sign detector, because it is unusual
in practice to deal with images that consist largely of road
sign. Instead, one usually deals with images that contain
many things, and must find and label the road sign. It is
natural to study road sign classifiers (e.g. [26]) because im-
age classification remains difficult and academic studies of
feature constructions are important. But there is no partic-
ular threat posed by an attack on a road sign classifier. An
attack on a road sign detector is an entirely different matter.
For example, imagine the danger if one could get a template
that, with a can of spray paint, could ensure that a detector
reads a stop sign as a yield sign (or worse!). As a result, it
is important to know whether (a) such examples could exist
and (b) how robust their adversarial property is in practice.
Recently, Evtimov et al. have shown several physical
stop signs that are misclassified [6]. They cropped the stop
signs from the frames before presenting them to the clas-
sifier. By cropping, they have proxied the box-prediction
process in a detector; however, their attack is not intended
as an attack on a detector (the paper does not use the word
“detector”, for example). Lu et al. showed that their con-
struction does not fool a standard detector [17], likely be-
cause the cropping process does not proxy a detector’s box
selection well, and suggested that constructing an adversar-
ial example that fools a detector might be hard. Figure 1
shows their stop signs presented in [6] are reliably detected
by Faster RCNN.
3. Method
We propose a method to generate digital and physical
adversarial examples that are robust to changes of viewing
Figure 1. Evtimov et al. [6] generated physical stop signs that are
misclassified, however, these stop signs are reliably detected by
Faster RCNN. Images from Figure 10 in [17].
conditions. Our registration and reconstruction based ap-
proach generates adversarial perturbations from video se-
quences of an object with moving cameras. We require the
objects in the videos to be accurately aligned in 3D space.
We can easily register stop signs as they are 2D polygons.
Moreover, we can accurately register face images to a vir-
tual 3D face model. Hence, we perform our experiments on
these two types of data.
3.1. Approach for stop signs
We use the stop sign example to demonstrate our attack,
which extends to other objects that are registered from im-
age domain to some root coordinate system (e.g. faces in
section 3.2). We search for an adversarial pattern that (a)
looks like a stop sign and (b) fools Faster RCNN. We se-
lect a set of N diverse frames Ii as the training examples to
generate the pattern. A stop sign is represented as a texture
map T in some root coordinate system. We construct (cur-
rently by hand) correspondences between eight vertices on
the stop sign instances in training frames and the vertices
of T . We use these correspondences to estimate a viewing
mapMi, which maps the texture T in the root coordinate
system to the appropriate pattern in training frame Ii. We
also incorporate inMi the illumination intensity, which is
estimated by computing the average intensity over the stop
sign in the image. Relative illumination intensities are used
to scale the adversarial perturbations. We write I(Mi, T )
for the image frame obtained by superimposing T on the
frame Ii using the mappingMi; Bs(I) for the set of stop
sign bounding boxes obtained by applying Faster RCNN to
the image I; and φs(b) for the score produced by Faster
RCNN’s classifier for a stop sign in box b. To produce an
adversarial example, we minimize the mean score for a stop
sign produced by Faster RCNN in all training images as a
function of T , that is
Φ(T ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
mean
b ∈ Bs(I(Mi, T )) φs(b)
possibly subject to some constraint on T , such as being
close to a normal stop sign in L2 distance. We have also
investigated minimizing the maximum score for all the stop
sign proposals, and found that minimizing the mean score
gives slightly better results.
Minimization procedure: First, we compute ∇T Φ(T )
by computing∇I meanb ∈ Bs(I(Mi, T ) φs(b). The gradients
in the frame coordinate system are mapped to the root co-
ordinate system with inverse view mappingM−1i , and then
are cropped to the extent of T in that coordinate system.
We average gradients mapped from all N training frames.
However, directly using the gradients to take large steps fre-
quently stalls the optimization process. Instead, we find that
computing the descent direction with the sign of the gradi-
ents for given pattern T (n) (n stands for iteration number)
facilitates the optimization process.
d(n) = sign(∇T Φ(T (n))).
We choose a very small step length  such that d(n) repre-
sents an update of one least significant bit, which leads to
an optimization step of form
T (n+1) = T (n) + d(n).
The optimization process usually takes hundreds or even
thousands of steps. One termination criterion is to stop the
optimization when the pattern fools the detector more than
90% of the cases on the validation set. Another termination
criterion is a fixed number of iterations.
Why large steps are hard: In our experiments, taking
large steps with unsigned gradients stalls the optimization
process, and we believe large steps are hard to take for
two reasons. First, each instance of the pattern occurs at
a different scale, meaning that there must be some up- or
down-sampling of the gradients when mapped to the root
coordinate system. Although we register the images with
subpixel accuracy, and use a bilinear method to interpolate
the transformation process, signal losses are still inevitable.
In section 4.2, we show some evidence that this effect may
make our patterns more, rather than less, robust. Second,
the structure of the network means that the gradient is a
poor guide to the behavior of φs(b) over large scales. In
particular, a ReLU network divides its input space into a
very large number of cells, and values at any layer before
the softmax layer are a continuous piecewise linear func-
tion within a cell. Because the network is trained to have a
(roughly) constant output for large pieces of its input space,
the gradient must wiggle from cell to cell, and so may be a
poor guide to the long scale behavior of the function.
Constraining distance to the original stop sign: In or-
der to create less perceivable adversarial perturbations, we
constrain the distance to the original stop sign to be small.
An L2 distance loss is added to the cost function, and we
minimize
Φ(T ) + λ||T − T (0)||2
Our experiments show that this distance constraint still can-
not help to create small perturbations, but greatly changes
the pattern of the perturbations, refer to Figure 6.
We create our physical adversarial stop signs by printing
the pattern T , cutting out the printed stop sign area, and
sticking it to an actual stop sign (30 in by 30 in).
3.2. Extending to faces
We extend the experiments onto faces, which have com-
plex geometries and larger intra class variances, to demon-
strate that our analysis generalizes to other classes. In the
face setting, we search for a pattern that fools a Faster
RCNN based face detector [12] and looks like the origi-
nal face. Our root coordinate system for faces is a vir-
tual high quality face mesh generated from morphable face
model [2]. For video sequences of a face, we reconstruct the
geometry of the face in the input frames using morphable
face model built from the FaceWarehouse [3] data. The
model produces a 3D face mesh F (wi, we) that is a function
of identity parameters wi, and expression parameters we.
FaceTracker [25] is used to detect landmarks li on the face
frames, then we recover parameters and poses of the face
mesh by minimizing the distances between the projected
landmark vertices and their corresponding landmark loca-
tions on the image planes. This construction gives us pixel-
to-mesh and mesh-to-pixel dense correspondences between
all face frames and the root face coordinate system (shared
face mesh). By projecting image pixels to the face meshes
via barycentric coordinates, we can achieve subpixel accu-
rate pixel-to-pixel registrations between all face frames (via
root coordinate system). This correspondences are used to
transfer the gradients from face image coordinates to the
root coordinate system, then we merge the gradients from
multiple images and reverse transfer the merged gradients
back to the face image coordinates.
4. Results
In this section, we describe in depth the experiments
we did and the results we got. Our supplementary
materials include videos and more results, and it can
be downloaded from http://jiajunlu.com/docs/
advDetector_supp.zip. Our high resolution pa-
per can be downloaded from http://jiajunlu.com/
Original Image Detected Whole Image Attacked Sign Region Attacked
Figure 2. Modifying a single stop sign image to attack Faster
RCNN is successful. In the original stop sign image (first), the
stop sign is reliably detected. In the second image, small pertur-
bations are added to the whole image, and the stop sign is not
detected. In the last image, small perturbations are added to the
stop sign region instead of the whole image, and the stop sign is
detected as a vase.
Original Image Detected Whole Image Attacked Face Region Attacked
Figure 3. Modifying a face image to attack Faster RCNN is suc-
cessful. In the original face image (first), the face is reliably de-
tected. In the second image, small perturbations are added to the
whole image, and the face is not detected. In the last image,
slightly larger perturbations are added to the face region instead
of the whole image, and the face is not detected.
docs/advDetector.pdf. But let us first give a quick
overview of our findings:
• Adding small perturbations suffices to fool a given ob-
ject detector on a single image.
• Enforcing the adversarial perturbations to generalize
across view conditions requires significant changes to
the pattern.
• Our successful attacks for Faster RCNN generalize to
YOLO.
• Our successful attacks with very large perturbations
generalize to the physical world objects in suitable cir-
cumstances.
• Simple defenses fail to defeat adversarial examples
that can generalize.
Detectors are affected by internal thresholds. Faster
RCNN uses a non maximum suppression threshold and a
confidence threshold. For stop signs, we used the default
configurations. For faces, we found the detector is too will-
ing to detect faces, and we made it less responsive to faces
(nms from 0.15 to 0.3, and conf from 0.6 to 0.8). We used
default YOLO configurations.
 Original 
Sequence
 Attacked 
Sequence
Figure 4. Adversarial examples of stop signs for Faster RCNN that can generalize across view conditions. The original sequence in the first
row is a test video sequence captured for a real stop sign, and the stop sign is detected in all the frames. We apply our attack to a training
set of videos to generate a cross view condition adversarial perturbation, and apply that perturbation on this test sequence to generate the
attacked sequence in the second row. This is a digital attack, and the stop sign is either not detected or detected as a kite.
 Original 
Sequence
 Attacked 
Sequence
Figure 5. Adversarial examples of faces for Faster RCNN based face detector [12] that can generalize across view conditions. The original
sequence images in the first row are sampled from a test video sequence, and all the faces are reliably detected. We apply our attacking
method to a training set of videos to generate a cross view condition adversarial perturbation, and apply that perturbation on this test
sequence to generate the attacked sequence in the second row. This is a digital attack.
4.1. Attacking single image
We can easily adjust a pattern on a single image to fool
a detector (stop signs in Figure 2 and faces in Figure 3),
and the change on the pattern is tiny. While this is of no
practical significance, it shows our search method can find
very small adversarial perturbations.
4.2. Generalizing across view conditions
What we are really interested in is to produce a pattern
that fails to be detected in any image. This is much harder
because our pattern needs to generalize to different view
conditions and so on. We can still find adversarial patterns
in this situation, but the patterns found by our process in-
volve significant changes of the stop signs and faces.
Stop sign dataset: we use a Panasonic HC-V700M HD
camera to take 22 videos of the camera approaching stop
signs, and extract 5 diverse frames from each video. Then
we manually register all the stop signs, and use our attack-
ing method to generate a unified adversarial perturbation
for all the frames. We use 12 videos for generating adver-
sarial perturbations (training), 5 videos for validation, and
5 videos for evaluation (testing). We use the validation set
Figure 6. We generate three adversarial stop signs with our attack-
ing method. The first stop sign does not use L2 distance penalty,
and use termination criterion of successfully attacking 90% of val-
idation images. The second stop sign uses L2 distance penalty
in the objective function, and terminates when 90% of validation
images are attacked. The last stop sign also adopts L2 distance
penalty, but performs a large fixed number of iterations. All three
patterns reliably fool detectors when mapped into videos. How-
ever, physical instances of these patterns are not equally success-
ful. The first two stop signs, as physical objects, only occasionally
fool Faster RCNN; the third one, which has a much more extreme
pattern, is more effective.
termination criteria described in Section 3.1. Figure 4 gives
an example video sequence, and its corresponding attacked
video sequence. Table 1 shows the stop sign detection rates
in different circumstances. We plan to release the labelled
Seq 1
Seq 2
Seq 3
Figure 7. We print the three adversarial stop signs from Figure 6, and stick them to a real stop sign. We took videos while driving by these
printed stop signs, and ran Faster RCNN on these videos. Notice that all of the adversarial perturbations generalize well digitally. We only
render the detection results for stop signs to make the figures clean. The three sequences in this figure correspond to the three stop signs
in order. In the first two sequences, stop signs are detected without trouble, while in the last sequence, the stop sign is not detected in the
video, so it is a physical adversarial stop sign. This may be the result of poor texture contrast against the tree, though this sequence was not
seen in training.
dataset.
Face dataset:: we use a SONY a7 camera to take 5
videos of a still face from different distances and angles,
and extract 20 diverse frames from each video. We use the
morphable face model approach to register all the faces, and
use our attacking method to generate a unified adversarial
perturbation. We use 3 videos for generating adversarial
perturbations (training), 1 video for validation, and 1 video
for evaluation (testing). Again, we use the validation set ter-
mination criteria described in Section 3.1. Figure 5 shows
an example video sequence, and its corresponding attacked
video sequence. In our experiments, this is the smallest per-
turbations on faces that could generalize. Table 2 shows
the face detection rates in different circumstances. Also, we
plan to release the processed dataset.
In summary, it is possible to attack stop signs and faces
from multiple images, and require them to generalize to new
similar view condition images. However, both of them re-
quire strong perturbation patterns to generalize. Refer to
supplementary materials for details.
4.3. Generalizing to the physical world
There is a big gap between attacks in the digital world
and attacks in the physical world, which means the adver-
sarial perturbations that generalize well in the digital world
may not generalize to the physical world. We suspect this
gap is due to various practical concerns, such as sensor
properties, view conditions, printing errors, lighting, etc. In
this paper, we print stop signs and perform physical experi-
ments with them, but we believe similar conclusions apply
to faces.
We performed physical experiments with three adversar-
ial perturbation patterns in Figure 6. Our results in Table 3
show that the two less perturbed stop signs can still be de-
tected by Faster RCNN, while the one with large perturba-
tions is hard to detect. The frames for physical experiments
could be found in Figure 7. Refer to our supplementary ma-
terials for videos.
We performed analysis with the data from Table 1 and
Table 3. L1 regularized logistic regression is used to predict
the success of our many different cases. The most important
variable is detector (generalization from Faster RCNN to
YOLO is not strong); then whether the adversarial example
is physical or not (digital attacks are more effective than
physical); then scale (it is hard to make a detector to miss a
nearby stop sign).
4.4. Generalizing to YOLO
Adversarial examples for a certain classifier generalize
across different classifiers. To test out whether adversar-
ial examples for Faster RCNN generalize across detectors,
we feed these images into YOLO. We categorize our ad-
versarial examples into three categories: single image ex-
amples with small perturbations, multiple image examples
test - far test - medium test - near train - far train - medium train - near val - far val - medium val - near
Tree bg - L Stop1 0/4 ; 4/4 0/4 ; 1/4 0/2 ; 2/2 0/10 ; 6/10 0/10 ; 1/10 0/5 ; 5/5 1/4 ; 3/4 0/4 ; 3/4 0/2 ; 2/2Stop2 0/4 ; 4/4 1/4 ; 3/4 0/2 ; 2/2 2/10 ; 1/10 1/10 ; 0/10 2/5 ; 3/5 0/4 ; 1/4 0/4 ; 0/4 0/2 ; 0/2
Tree bg - EL Stop3 n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a 1/5 ; 5/5 0/5 ; 0/5 0/4 ; 1/4 n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a
Sky bg - L Stop1 0/6 ; 6/6 0/6 ; 5/6 0/3 ; 3/3 0/14 ; 13/14 0/14 ; 12/14 0/7 ; 6/7 0/6 ; 6/6 0/6 ; 5/6 0/3 ; 2/3Stop2 0/6 ; 6/6 0/6 ; 6/6 0/3 ; 3/3 0/14 ; 13/14 2/14 ; 12/14 1/7 ; 6/7 0/6 ; 6/6 0/6 ; 5/6 1/3 ; 2/3
Sky bg - EL Stop3 0/4 ; 3/4 0/4 ; 1/4 0/4 ; 3/4 0/5 ; 5/5 0/5 ; 5/5 0/4 ; 4/4 n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a n/a ; n/a
Table 1. This table reports the detection rates of Faster RCNN and YOLO for the multiple image digital attacks of stop signs. In each cell,
the ratio before semicolon represents the detection rate for Faster RCNN, and the ratio after semicolon represents the detection rate for
YOLO. Tree bg means the background of the stop sign is tree and has low contrast, and the Sky bg means the background of the stop sign
is sky and has high contrast. L following the background means the perturbations are large, and EL means the perturbations are extremely
large. We have three dark stop signs, and the detection rates are calculated at three different distances (far/medium/near) on train/val/test
splits. We can attack Faster RCNN with multiple view conditions, and the adversarial perturbations generalize to new view conditions.
The adversarial examples also generalize to YOLO, especially when the background is tree.
test train val
ft-far ft-near sd-far sd-near ft-far front-near sd-far sd-near ft-far ft-near sd-far sd-near
S100 small perturbation 2/3 2/4 6/6 6/7 0/19 0/21 0/9 0/11 1/4 6/8 3/4 3/4
S100 medium perturbation 3/3 2/4 6/6 3/7 5/19 1/21 1/9 0/11 2/4 4/8 4/4 3/4
S100 large perturbation 0/3 0/4 1/6 0/7 0/19 0/21 0/9 0/11 0/4 0/8 0/4 0/4
S15 large perturbation 0/1 n/a 0/2 n/a 0/3 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/1 n/a 0/2 n/a
Table 2. This table reports the detection rates of Faster RCNN based face detector [12] for multiple image digital attacks of faces. S100
means there are 100 images in the experiments, and S15 means there are 15 images. Ft means frontal face, and sd means side face. When
small perturbations are applied, attacks on all the training images succeed, but do not generalize to the validation and testing images. Only
when large perturbations are applied, the attacks generalize to different view conditions.
far - adv far - clean medium - adv medium - clean near - adv near - clean
Tree bg - L
Dark-Stop1 2/17 ; 4/17 16/17 ; n/a 11/12 ; 12/12 12/12 ; n/a 8/8 ; 8/8 8/8 ; n/a
Dark-Stop2 4/17 ; 5/17 n/a ; n/a 6/11 ; 10/11 n/a ; n/a 0/14 ; 12/14 n/a ; n/a
Bright-Stop1 10/17 ; 16/17 17/17 ; n/a 15/15 ; 15/15 15/15 ; n/a 12/12 ; 12/12 12/12 ; n/a
Bright-Stop2 1/17 ; 2/17 14/17 ; n/a 10/12 ; 12/12 12/12 ; n/a 5/8 ; 8/8 8/8 ; n/a
Tree bg - EL Dark-Stop3 0/17 ; 0/17 17/17 ; n/a 4/14 ; 10/14 14/14 ; n/a 8/11 ; 7/11 11/11 ; n/aBright-Stop3 0/17 ; 0/17 11/17 ; n/a 1/11 ; 3/11 11/11 ; n/a 0/7 ; 1/7 7/7 ; n/a
Sky bg - L
Dark-Stop1 1/19 ; 5/19 0/19 ; n/a 9/11 ; 11/11 0/13 ; n/a 16/16 ; 16/16 14/16 ; n/a
Dark-Stop2 0/25 ; 14/25 2/25 ; n/a 5/15 ; 11/15 1/15 ; n/a 24/24 ; 11/24 22/24 ; n/a
Bright-Stop1 5/26 ; 23/26 0/26 ; n/a 10/11 ; 11/11 1/11 ; n/a 21/21 ; 21/21 14/21 ; n/a
Bright-Stop2 1/23 ; 16/23 0/23 ; n/a 10/11 ; 9/11 0/11 ; n/a 20/24 ; 19/24 18/24 ; n/a
Sky bg - EL Dark-Stop3 14/27 ; 16/27 20/27 ; n/a 3/13 ; 11/13 13/13 ; n/a 26/27 ; 26/27 27/27 ; n/aBright-Stop3 0/28 ; 11/28 0/24 ; n/a 0/13 ; 10/13 2/13 ; n/a 22/24 ; 10/24 18/24 ; n/a
Table 3. The detection rates of the physical adversarial stop signs and physical clean stop signs with Faster RCNN and YOLO in different
circumstances. The table layout is similar to Table 1. We have two stop signs with different brightness for large perturbations, and one stop
sign with different brightness for extremely large perturbations. We report both detection rates for 30 x 30 inches adversarial stop signs
(adv) and 20 x 20 inches clean normal stop signs when applicable (clean).
with large perturbations that generalize across viewing con-
ditions digitally, and physical examples with large perturba-
tions. Our experiments show that small perturbations do not
generalize to YOLO, while obvious perturbation patterns
can generalize to YOLO with good probability. Examples
are given in Figure 8, and detection rates can be found in
Table 3 and Table 1.
4.5. Localized attacks fail
In previous settings, we attack the whole masked objects
in the images, however, it is usually hard to apply such at-
tacks in the physical world. For example, modifying the
whole stop sign patterns is useless in practice, and wearing
a whole face mask with perturbation patterns is hard too. It
would be more effective attack if one can manufacture small
stickers with perturbation patterns, and when the sticker is
attached to a small region of the stop sign or the face fore-
Single
Image
Multiple
  Image
Physical
Figure 8. We test whether adversarial examples generated from
Faster RCNN generalize to YOLO. In the first row, these adver-
sarial examples are generated for a single image with small pertur-
bations. YOLO can detect these stop signs without trouble. In the
second row, these adversarial examples are generated from multi-
ple images, and the digitally perturbed images can fool YOLO in
about half of the times. In the last row, physically printed adver-
sarial stop signs can still fool YOLO in some circumstances. The
detailed summary can be found in Table 1 and Table 3.
Figure 9. Localized attacks for stop signs and faces fail in the mul-
tiple view condition setting. We applied attacks on regions of the
stop signs and faces with very large number of iterations, and in-
troduced extremely large perturbations, but the objects are still de-
tected. In detail, localized attacks on stop signs can sometimes
digitally fool far stop signs, but not for middle and near stop signs;
localized attacks on faces cannot fool face detector. The first im-
age is an example of perturbed stop signs, and the second image is
an example of perturbed faces.
head, the detector would fail. Evtimov et al. [6] showed an
example that successfully attacked stop sign classifiers. We
try to generate adversarial patterns constrained to a fixed re-
gion of the objects to fool detectors, however, we find these
attacks only occasionally successful (stop signs) or wholly
unsuccessful (faces). Figure 9 shows some examples.
4.6. Simple defenses fail
Recently, Guo et al. [11] showed that simple image pro-
cessing could defeat a majority of imperceivable adversarial
attacks. We assume detectors should run at frame rate, so
exclude image quilting. We investigated down-up sampling
and total variation smoothing defense. We find that these
methods can defeat attacks on a single image, but cannot
NonAttack Adversarial UP TV
Single 10/10 0/10 10/10 10/10
Multiple
stop1 110/110 1/110 8/110 8/110
stop2 110/110 10/110 18/110 9/110
stop3 40/40 1/40 1/40 2/40
Physical
stop1 109/187 121/185 118/185 116/185
stop2 77/159 86/201 84/201 88/201
stop3 151/205 78/209 72/209 85/209
Table 4. We evaluate the effectiveness of simple defense methods.
UP means downsample the input image resolution by half, and
then upsample it to the original size. TV means total variation
denoise, which removes high frequency information. The physical
non attack numbers are counted from a real stop sign near our
adversarial one. These simple defense methods are effective for
single image perturbations, but not effective for multiple image
perturbations that can generalize. They also cannot defeat physical
adversarial perturbations.
Original Up-Down Sample TV Denoise
Single
Image
Multiple
  Image
Physical
Figure 10. We apply simple defenses [11] to adversarial examples
generated for Faster RCNN. Up-Down Sample means down sam-
ple the image resolution by half, and then upsample it to the orig-
inal resolution. TV Denoise means denoising the image with total
variation regularization, which will remove the high frequency in-
formation and keep the low frequency information. In the first
row, the adversarial examples generated from a single image with
small perturbations can be detected after simple image processing.
In the second row, the adversarial examples generated from mul-
tiple view conditions still cannot be detected after simple defense.
In the last row, the physically printed adversarial stop signs still
cannot be detected after simple defense.
disrupt the large patterns needed to produce adversarial ex-
amples that generalize, see Figure 10 and Table 4. Our hy-
pothesis for this phenomenon is that tiny perturbations work
with numerical accumulation mechanism, which is not ro-
bust to changes, while obvious perturbations work with pat-
tern recognition mechanism, which is more robust and can
better generalize.
5. Conclusion
We have demonstrated the first adversarial examples that
can fool detectors. Our construction yields physical objects
that fool detectors too. However, all the adversarial pertur-
bations we have been able to construct require large per-
turbations. This suggests that the box prediction step in a
detector acts as a form of natural defense. We speculate
that better viewing models in our construction may yield a
smaller gap between physical and digital results. Our pat-
terns may reveal something about what is important to a
detector.
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